Response to: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2pCn_w377Qo
When I heard I had a response from a guy calling himself Inane I thought it had to be a joke. But lo and behold he was seriously attempting to refute my series on the case for the soul. Considering the series has been up for quite some time and I’ve dealt with numerous objections in the comment section already, I suspected his response would be much of the same, reveal how little he has read on this topic, assuming his conclusion (physicalism), and show a total lack of understanding of idealism. I turned out to be right, as with every physicalist response I get to this series. So let’s dive in to hear what Inane D has to say.
He begins by saying at 1:23, “What I am arguing and will defend here is Inspiring Philosophy fails to make his case.” Now, first of all, why does this guy have to over-annunciate everything he says? How can anyone listen to this? Inane D, seriously man, just talk like a normal person, but I digress.
I highlighted this claim on purpose because it implies something very important. What he does throughout the video is assume physicalism is already true and therefore no evidence can lead to idealism because he already knows physicalism is true so all the evidence I present cannot possibly mean idealism is more probably true for reality. He basically assumes his conclusion and argues in a circle, which is why he is only arguing I fail to make my case and does not offer positive evidence for physicalism. It is common for many materialists, atheists, physicalists (people who tend to believe these or related ideas) to just assume their worldview is the default and when a theist or an idealist tries to offer evidence of an alternative worldview they simply say “you’ve not made your case.” What that shows is they assume their conclusion, and then attempt to explain the data away by any means necessary, and reveal how circular their argument is. In reality, agnosticism is a default position and we offer theories to explain the data we have available, then debate on which theory is the most parsimonious and plausible (given our current data). Inane D doesn’t want to do that. Instead, he spends his time just assuming physicalism is already true.
At 2:44 Inane D says, “Am I alone in seeing how dishonest claiming that neurons are essentially the same as liver cells.” He also accused me of claiming this without a source. The ironic thing is if he would have actually looked at all my sources, he would see this very statement came from the opening pages of Jeffery Schwartz’s book, “The Mind and the Brain.” All he had to was read the first page of the first chapter. Allow me to quote Schwartz directly:
“Of all the thousands of pages and millions of words devoted to the puzzle of the mind and the brain, to the mystery of how something as sublime and insubstantial as thought or consciousness can merge from thee pounds of gelatinous pudding inside the full, my favorite statement of the problem is not that of one of the great philosophers of history, but of a science fiction writer. In a short story first published in the science and sci-fi magazine Omni in 1991, the Hugo-winning author Terry Bisson gets right to the heart of the utter absurdity of the situation: that an organ made from basically the same material ingredients (nucleated, carbon-based, mitochondria-filled cells) as, say, a kidney, is able to generate this ineffable thing called a mind.” (1)
As you see the opening of my video is a paraphrase of Schwartz’s opening lines from chapter 1. I was literally parroting what an actual neuroscience said. The point myself and Schwartz were making is the brain is built of the same material as your other organs, yet according to physicalists, it is able to magically generate consciousness.
One of my favorite line from Inane D comes right after this, “When you open your argument with such a misrepresentation of anatomy it really begs the question of how well you have thought this out and whether or not you are a lying SOB.” Despite the fact he committed the modern error of misusing the phrase “begs the question,” the irony of this statement is astounding considering he did not check my sources. On a side note, he clearly is following the dogmatic tendencies of other new atheists. Researcher Jonathan Haidt points this out. Watch this video and then listen to Inane D talk and you can clearly see the dogmatic tendencies associated with Harris and Dawkins:
Again, back on point, the issue is how can matter produce an entire subjective conscious experience when organized as a brain. There is no evidence matter (in the form of brains) is able to do this, and Inane D has to admit this, because after going on about how could I open my video by stating the hard problem of consciousness, he says right after this, “Now, I agree. We don’t know precisely how consciousness arises from the brain. We don’t know if it does.”
Yeah, Inane D, that was precisely my point, but because I stated the same idea (that he just admitted to) in my own words (paraphrasing Dr. Schwartz ) I am either ignorant or a lying SOB. Haidt’s psychological analysis is really ringing true here.
At 3:20, Inane D says, “What we do know is we have a lot to learn about the human brain and consciousness works. So I prefer not to stotafy the amazing research being done in this field of neuroscience by abandoning investigation in favor going, “we have souls.”
First, I am not sure what word he used. I think I heard ‘stotafy,’ so I am not sure what he was trying to say. But here we presuppositional argument in full bloom: Physicalism must be true, so all research must confirm physicalism, otherwise it must be wrong or currently incomplete. First, who said we are abandoning research and further investigation? I advocate that, and what I have found is it seems the more evidence that comes out leads to an idealist picture of reality, as the evidence from neuroscience in my series shows. Inane D seems to suggest unless the research leads to a physicalist’s conclusion it must not be science. What if the data does lead to the existence of an immaterial mind? Then is it not amazing research at that point? Again, as we see through his video, all he does is assume his conclusion, namely physicalism, so the evidence has to confirm physicalism and if it does not it is not real evidence.
Second, you’ll see one of the things he does is if evidence (like what I go over in my series) does lead to an idealistic picture of the mind that just means it’s a gap in our understanding and future humans will provide us with a physicalist explanation. This is nothing more than arguing for a ‘future human of the gaps.’ How does he know people in the future will not simply give us more evidence for idealism, instead of confirming physicalism? Well, again, because Inane D just assumes physicalism is true, so all the evidence has to infer physicalism and if it does not, that is because future humans will do it for us.
This is pretty clear because after this he says that I am arguing “science fails and we need to assert souls.” Here we see a typical physicalist equating science with physicalism. That is not how it works, kid. I’m not arguing science fails and therefore souls. I’m clearly arguing scientific data leads to an idealistic picture of reality. It is the height of irrationality to equate your metaphysical views with science. It is quite Inane.
In the next section, he tries to take apart Wilder Penfield’s research and is quite funny what he does here. First, he gives two citations for this section of his video, one is Penfield’s book (which we will show he did not read) and a short PBS biography on Penfield. Neither of these sources back up the claims he is about to make. I am also highly skeptical that he even bothered to read Penfield’s book.
At 5:00 he says, “Dr. Penfield was relating his opinion and his conclusions based on what was known from his active work during the 1940s and the 1950s.”
Now what you expect to follow from a statement like this would be a paper showing how a later neuroscientist reversed some of Penfield’s conclusions or how someone did show you could stimulate the will through the brain, but Inane D does not. He basically implies, ‘Penfield’s work is old therefore we should be skeptical.’ That doesn’t show us Penfield’s conclusions, based on his research, were incorrect. No one has overturned his point that you cannot stimulate the will through electrical stimulation on the brain. The fact that this was from the 1940s and 1950s doesn’t somehow refute his point unless of course Inane D can provide more up-to-date research to overturn this and he does not.
I wonder if he applies this logic elsewhere? Should we doubt special relativity since Einstein proposed it over 100 years ago? Erwin Schrödinger proposed the Shrödinger almost 100 years ago, should we doubt these theories because they are old? Of course not, because later research has only confirmed this early research. Likewise, nothing has been demonstrated to overturn Penfield’s conclusions (even looking at the region of the brain called the Diencephalon), which is probably why Inane D cannot cite any papers to refute Penfield’s inference. He just seems to say, “well this stuff is old, so it cannot be trusted.” Well if that is true back it up with some more recent data.
Next Inane D says “[Penfield’s] conclusions were based on personal incredulity.” And he says this clearly is seen on page 79. I thought it was odd that Inane D didn’t just read us what page 79 says. Well luckily, I own Penfield’s book and could easily look for myself to see what utter nonsense this is. Not only that, I can provide a screenshot of what page 79 says:
As you can see Penfield never says he is arguing from incredulity or his opinion. What he seems to say is he is proposing a hypothesis based on his data, not asserting his opinion without data to back it up. An argument from incredulity would be saying he can’t imagine it any other way, therefore, it must be true the mind exists and is not a product of the brain. In reality, Penfield is drawing this hypothesis (substance dualism) based on his own data. As he says earlier, “As I visualize it, a reasonable, explanatory hypothesis can be constructed as follows: because I had asked the patient to do so, he turned his attention to the naming of cards, programming the brain to that end through the highest brain-mechanism. I can say only that the decision came from his mind. Neuronal action began in the highest brain-mechanism. Here is the meeting of mind and brain. The psychico-physical frontier is here. The frontier is being crossed from mind to brain. The frontier is also being crossed from brain to mind since the mind is conscious of the meaning of the neuronal succession that determines the content of the stream of consciousness. The neuronal action is automatic as it is in any computer. In conformity with the mind’s decision, the highest.” (2)
Penfield has not asserted his hypothesis from own incredulity but from his research and logical arguments. It is an inference from his data. Calling his hypothesis an argument from incredulity is a quote mine, or worse yet, it shows you did not read what he said in context. Ironically, Inane D says I quote-mined Penfield, while at the same time not showing how any quotes from his book on how I did this. It amazes me he doesn’t want to provide any quotes from Penfield’s book to demonstrate the quote mine. I wonder why that is?
Inane D says this cannot be used to support the existence of the immaterial mind or soul. However, he completely ignored the main point. Obviously, we do ‘will’ things to happen in our conscious experience, yet there has never been any data to show you can do this to an individual through physical stimulation. If the will is an emergent product of the brain, then we ought to be able to force the will through physical stimulation, yet we cannot and no experiment has ever shown this to be possible. Yet, we know we do ‘will’ things to happen in our conscious experience. We cannot deny this. So if it is not in the brain, then (as Penfield inferred) it existed in the immaterial mind and is beyond the physical. In other words, if we know something exists (our wills) and there is no evidence this is physically in the brain, then the most likely explanation is it is immaterial, as Penfield inferred, “For my own part, after years of striving to explain the mind on the basis of brain-action alone, I have come to the conclusion that it is simpler (and far easier to be logical) if one adopts the hypothesis that our being does consist of two fundamental elements.” (3)
Now, even I disagree with his inference to dualism, as I am a monistic idealist, but I do agree with him if the will cannot be found in the brain then there is no reason to suggest it is physical. Inane D’s only arguments seem to be to say his work is old, call him prejudice, and say Penfield only suggested his opinion (which we have shown was not the case). I suspect he did not read the book, as he did not read Schwartz’s book. As it is, unless someone can show the will can be physically controlled in the brain there is no evidence to suggest it is physical, and thus, the best explanation is it is not physical or emergent from the brain.
He then goes on to argue his philosophical presupposition at 6:50 when he says, “…consciousness should ultimately have a simplistic, local origin. Inspiring Philosophy is looking a for a tree we could call the seed of consciousness while ignoring the possibility we might need to be looking for a forest.”
I really don’t know what say about this statement. He clearly doesn’t understand idealism. First off, no, I am not looking for a seed of consciousness. I believe consciousness is fundamental and everything happens in consciousness. As even Sam Harris has said one of the things we cannot deny is that we are conscious. I am not looking for a seed, I’m pointing out we are in the forest, itself.
Second, why should consciousness have a simplistic, local origin? Again, I’m not a substance dualist. I am not positing consciousness is in another realm or far from our understanding. I don’t think he understands idealism so he created a straw man version of it, where he seems to think we believe consciousness is a mysterious substance far away. This is wrong on so many levels. Again, idealists argue consciousness is fundamental. We are not looking for a seed of consciousness because we don’t think such a concept would exist, as that assumes physicalism and consciousness would need to be emergent from some other thing. If you are going to attack idealism, at least understand what we are claiming, because if you don’t you will look rather foolish.
Next, we finally get to the first study he decides to cite and we already 7 minutes in. Inane D says this study shows general anesthetics induces unconsciousness and shows changes in brain activity. First, what on earth is talking about? We have known for decades you can induce unconsciousness using general anesthetics. That doesn’t show the brain creates consciousness and even substance dualists recognize this fact. Of course, you can induce unconsciousness using physical means. You can hit me over the head with a baseball bat and if I don’t die I’ll probably be unconscious for several hours. This is not a challenge to idealism and we have known about this for centuries. I addressed these types of arguments at the end of my video, and basically pointed out the physical universe is mental information that obviously can alter and change our conscious experience. As for inducing unconsciousness, I’ll quote Bernardo Kastrup on this:
“Let us consider this more carefully. Imagine that you wake up in the morning after hours of deep sleep. You may remember nothing of what happened during those preceding hours, concluding that you were unconscious all night. Then, later in the day, you suddenly remember that you actually had a very intense dream. So you were not unconscious all night, you simply could not remember your experiences. Indeed, all we can assert with confidence upon coming round from episodes of seeming unconsciousness is that we cannot remember phenomenality occurring during those episodes. The actual absence of phenomenality is impossible to assert with confidence. As a matter of fact, many things we have traditionally associated with unconsciousness are now known to entail intense experiences. For instance, fainting caused by e.g. asphyxiation, strangulation or hyperventilation is known to correlate with euphoria, insights and visions (Neal 2008: 310–315, Rhinewine and Williams 2007, Retz 2007). G-force-induced loss of consciousness (G-LOC) is also known to correlate with “memorable dreams” (Whinnery and Whinnery 1990). There is even evidence for “implicit perception” during general anesthesia (Kihlstrom and Cork 2007). Sleep, of course, is known to correlate with dreams. But even during phases of sleep wherein electroencephalogram readings show no dream-related neural activity, there are other types of activity that may correlate with non-recallable phenomenality distinct from dreams. Indeed, this is precisely what a recent study points out: “there are good empirical and theoretical reasons for saying that a range of different types of sleep experience, some of which are distinct from dreaming, can occur in all stages of sleep” (Windt, Nielsen, and Thompson 2016: 871, emphasis added). The authors identify three different categories of sleep experiences distinct from dreams: (a) non-immersive imagery and sleep thinking, (b) perceptions and bodily sensations, and (c) “selfless” states and contentless sleep experiences that may be similar to those reported by experienced meditators. As such, what the empirical data shows is that episodes of seem- ing unconsciousness are associated with an impairment of memory formation or access, but not necessarily with absence of phenomenality. As a matter of fact, there are strong indications, as mentioned above, that the opposite is true. (4)”
Full paper here so you can check sources.
Nothing in the study Inane D cited shows how physical activity can create consciousness. So once again, if you are going to attack idealism take a few minutes to study what our claims are. Don’t just build a straw man, and inadvertently reveal how little research you did.
For the rest of the video Inane D attempt to attack this paper I cited. This paper shows there is place in the brain that gives rise to united perceptions, like what we experience. However, his response can be described metaphorically, as thinking, he has scored a touchdown but hasn’t realized he ran into the wrong end zone. Inane D starts off by saying at 8:25, “And again, you make this about the ignorance we currently have about the brain, or at a minimum, the ignorance you have about what science can tell us about the brain. The answer is we aren’t sure.”
Okay, this is quite a hysterical and contradictory response. So here I am in my original video, citing a paper on the neural binding problem and Inane D responds by claiming I am ignorant about science then goes on to agree with me we cannot explain how the brain could create unified perceptions in conscious experience. He admits we aren’t sure how this could be explained, which is precisely my point. Again, I go right back to Jonathan Haidt’s psychological assessment of New Atheists, like Inane D. He is following along with the dogmatic pattern quite well.
He goes on to recommend some books that explore possible answers (that pre-date the paper I cited). Now, I never denied there are possible answers physicalists have come up with on how to explain united perceptions. They have all ultimately failed to find any neuroscientific evidence to support them, as even Inane D just admitted when he said, “The answer is we aren’t sure.”
Next, he then suggests, “… that the most likely answer is that there isn’t a single place in the brain that produces a comprehensive field of vision. It’s far more likely to be a distributed process. That doesn’t rely on some location within the brain. So asking the question, “where in the brain…” is to miss the point!”
Ironically, he seems to have missed the point. Whether it is a region or the entire brain no evidence has shown how the brain creates unified perceptions. As Jerome Feldman even admits in his conclusion, “Similarly, general coordination across areas is a necessary condition for a unified subjective experience, but says nothing about the hard qualia problem.” So again, there is no evidence with all our current data the brain can explain unified perceptions. The fact that some physicalists have proposed some solutions doesn’t mean they are sound in their attempts. You need to do a little more than note there have been possibilities proposed. Possibilities are not probabilities.
He goes on for several minutes about this and seems to have missed the point, yet again. He agrees there is no specific place in the brain that unites perceptions, which is good but keeps harping on about the hypotheses that perhaps total brain function unites perceptions. Well, again, that hardly challenges the issue. If the whole brain has been mapped and we cannot find something in the brain (or the brain as a whole) that unites perceptions it is likely not the brain that is doing this.
Let’s explain with an analogy: imagine you and I see a white rabbit go around a corner. We chase after it and see a field and a house with an open door. We enter the house to search for the rabbit. We tear the house apart looking for it, we move around all the furniture, check every closet and drawer, we spend several hours searching for this rabbit. How long before we determine the most probable explanation is the rabbit is not in the house and probably ran into the field? Sure, we cannot prove beyond reasonable doubt that the rabbit has not simply found an excellent hiding spot in the house, but given we have searched every square inch of the house several times over it is most likely not there.
Likewise, given we have scanned and searched the brain for how perceptions are unified it is likely the answer will not be found in the brain. Yet we cannot deny we experience united perceptions in our conscious experience, so it is likely this is happening in consciousness and it is not a creation of the brain.
Inane D telling us there really are unified perceptions in the brain is like when a proponent of A theory of time tell us the aether is really there. We have looked for aether in space, we have performed several experiments in an attempt to find it. We cannot prove beyond a shadow of a doubt it does not exist, but given how intensely we have searched for it, it likely does not exist. Likewise, given how extensive we have looked into the brain it is likely the brain cannot be the cause of unified perceptions. Inane D is really saying, “Trust me, it’s there, we will find it one day,” which is about as convincing as when William Lane Craig tells us the aether really is there, even though every attempt to find it has failed. Inane D is looking for is own aether to rescue physicalism.
Inane D then commits a genetic fallacy at about 12:00 where he attacks the Templeton Foundation, even after he just admitted that Feldman’s work should be taken seriously. He seems to contradict himself a lot. Should we take Feldman’s paper seriously, or can we not trust it because of his genetic fallacy? Am I ignorant for noting no neuroscientist has found evidence of the brain unifying perceptions or does he agree, as he said early, “the answer is we aren’t sure”? I am not sure what he is arguing, but he seems to be talking out of both sides of his mouth.
Next, he thinks he has found a ‘gotcha’ moment but actually revealed how little research he did. I had quote in my original video from the Feldman paper, “There is now overwhelming biological and behavioral evidence that the brain contains no stable, high-resolution, full field representation of a visual scene, even though that is what we subjectively experience (Martinez-Conde et al., 2008).” (5)
Inane D thought he found something clever and focused in on the “Martinez-Conde et al., 2008” citation from the quote. He found the link to it and displayed it on-screen at 13:54 and said, “It’s a fucking single page, a full three paragraphs. Well, should make for easy reading, odd! It’s not even talking about what the brain does or does not possess.”
Feldman was not citing the one page he pulled up. That one-page Inane D pulled up was essentially the abstract for the entire journal from October 2008. Feldman was citing the entire special issue of the journal, which was on the perceptions and the visual world. This single page is just the abstract for the entire issue, and it even implies so, as it says, “This special issue of Journal of Vision offers a broad compilation of recent discoveries concerning the perceptual consequences of eye movements in vision, as well as the mechanisms responsible for producing stable perception from unstable oculomotor behavior.” (6)
This single page is clearly an introduction to the entire month’s issue in the Journal of Vision. I really am confused on how Inane D missed this, because he says right after this, “In fact, the article is nothing more than the introduction to a special issue of the journal. It’s not a research paper!”
Yeah kid, exactly! Feldman was citing the whole journal, not just page. Why didn’t you realize that?
Next, he contradicts himself, yet again. He says, “I checked the other papers published in that same special issue. It’s not likely Feldman meant to reference one of them or even the issue as a whole because they don’t make the case that he would need them to do either.” So he seems to be suggested the special issue doesn’t talk about issues related to neural binding problems, but then he follows this line up by saying, “If anything, several of them do the opposite, offering testable hypotheses, or explanations of part of how we can create a stable representation of our vision as is often the case in this young field of research. The ultimate answer is, “we don’t know yet, but here is a path towards learning.”
Okay, so at first Inane D says, the special issue doesn’t make the case Feldman claims, but then he admits the special issue does deal with this topic and offers hypotheses on the issue. Then he admits the special issue doesn’t have an answer to the neural binding problem. So then, in reality, the special issue does acknowledge the issues related to the neural binding problem and does imply there has not been an answer on how this can be solved in a physicalist framework. So why is Feldman incorrect, exactly? Didn’t Inane D have to acknowledge the special issue does deal with the issues of the neural bindings problem and does not provide an answer to the issues surrounding it? I don’t think he realizes how much his own words betray him.
Next, Inane D reverts right back to the claim that the neural binding problem has not been solved but we will one day and when we do it will definitely confirm physicalism. After all, he did just say, “the ultimate answer is, “we don’t know yet, but here is a path towards learning.” Again, Inane D is assuming his conclusion. In reality, we do not assume there is an answer for this unless we have the data with us. We don’t assume it will just be there in the future. What if more evidence for idealism comes out? Will Inane D just say they will be explained away in the future until the day he dies, constantly assuming physicalism? That’s not how it works. We have to work with the data we have now, and just like all experimental evidence reveals, the best explanation is there is no aether (based on our current data) the most probable explanation is the brain alone cannot solve the neural binding problem. Inane D acknowledges there is no data that can support this physicalist’s notion, yet he also reveals he is committed to it, in light of the evidence.
Here are the links to the journal and you see for yourself.
Next, at 15:33 he notes the next citation Feldman offers is to a book he referenced earlier and I fail to see how this changes anything. The book, “The Primate Visual System” also does not offer an explanation on how to deal with the neural binding problem within a physicalist paradigm. No doubt the researchers throughout the book speculate on possible explanations, but once again, possibility is not probability. I fail to see what his point is here. Feldman is actually using their words against them, sort of like how Georges Lemaître once used Albert Einstein’s own work against him to show that space-time did have an absolute beginning. Kaas and Collins (Inane D even acknowledged this earlier in the video) note there is no current explanation for how the brain unifies perceptions, even though it has been completed mapped. Sure, I acknowledge (as does Feldman) that perhaps in the future this could change, However, we could also find out in the future the planet Nibiru really does exist, Atlantis really was an ancient city, the aether is real, and Elvis just went back to his home planet. Anything is possible, but it is not probable. And Feldman’s point is given the data he cites there is no evidence to suggest the brain alone can solve the neural binding problem (despite the speculation of some researchers).
But Inane D keeps going because he thinks he scored a touchdown. He tries to quote from the book, “The Primate Visual System” to debunk Feldman when he says in his paper, “The structure of the primate visual system has been mapped in detail (Kaas and Collins, 2003) and there is no area that could encode this detailed information.”
First, he quotes from page 153 and Inane says the page states, “But this understanding is of only the broad outline of the system… a continuation of studies focused on identifying visuals areas and resolving discrepancies and differences is proposals is greatly needed.”
What he does not tell you is the full context, so let me write it out for you “But this understanding is of only the broad outline of the system. What is disappointing is that we do not know exactly how visual cortex is divided into functionally unique areas or processing stations, and thus we cannot know the connections, the properties of neurons within areas, or the histochemical characteristics of the areas. Without knowing the extents of areas for certain, the results from all such studies are likely contaminated by mixtures of results from more than one area, and descriptions of projections from one to another area are confounded by uncertainties about boundaries of areas and the validity of proposed areas. For now, we can be fairly certain about the existence and extents of the visual areas, V1,V2, and MT. At least eight or more visual areas (V3, DM, MST, FSTd, FSTv, DLr, Dlc, and MTc) appear ready to join this list, but a continuation of studies focused on identifying visuals areas and resolving discrepancies and differences is proposals is greatly needed.” (7)
Okay, so once we see the full context of the quote we can see how quote mining is happening on Inane D’s part. First, it does say, “we can be fairly certain about the existence and extents of the visual areas…” So Feldman is correct, they have mapped out the visual areas of the brain. Interesting how Inane D skipped over that line. Second, if read the full quote in context we can see it says the visual cortex has been mapped, but we have not understood fully how the “visual cortex is divided into functionally unique areas or processing stations.” They are pointing out we do not fully understand the areas we have identified, but we have a broad understanding of what is going on and there is no neural binding area or process. Finally, the last one is about resolving discrepancies and differences in what has already been mapped and indentured. Again, they literally admit, right in between the two lines Inane D quote mined that, “we can be fairly certain about the existence and extents of the visual areas…”
See, Inane D has accused me a lot throughout his video of quote mining. In reality, quote mining cannot be asserted it has to be demonstrated as I have just done. That is how it works.
Next Inane D says that page 387 says, “We haven’t fully mapped or understood visual feedback connections.” There is just one tiny problem with this. This quote doesn’t exist. I am not sure where he pulled this from, but it is definitely not on page 387. I’ll even screen capture what the page says:
Ironically, page 387 does say, “The general organization of the corticocortical connections was mapped by extensive tract tracing studies especially during the last this of the 20th century.” The author then notes this is the first step but does not suggest there are other visual areas to identify, but instead the focus now is on how these different areas interact and the outcomes that result from them but does not suggest a physical answer has been found to the neural binding problem. (8)
I am very curious where he got this quote from because it is definitely not on page 387. Maybe he stated the wrong page number. But we need to see where it came from so we can check the context, because based on his track record so far, I doubt he got it right there as well.
Ironically, he then says I failed to do proper research. I’ll let this reply speak for itself on that one. Inane D seems to only rely on mockery and insults as he admits. Now Inane D, I have a serious question for you. What do you hope to accomplish with such obvious mockery? To make yourself look smart or mature? Is it to help me understand the error of my ways? Or is just stroke your own ego and talk down to me? This video comes across as nothing more than a sad attempt at cyber bullying. If you really wanted to give me the benefit of the doubt (as you say you do at the end of your video) then I would suspect a bit more respect, not the childish attitude. Also, you accused me of quote mining and lying, yet lo and behold based on my sources and screen captures you seem to be then quote mining. However, I am not going to stoop so low as to accuse you of lying. I am actually willing to give you the benefit of the doubt and suggest you are simply mistaken on certain things, did not do enough research, and simply failed to understand the claims of idealism. Unfortunately for you, Haidt’s psychology rings true once more with the accusation of lying.
The rest of the video is nothing more than insults, accusations, and genetic fallacies against Feldman and Penfield. All of which are clear markers of a mature and intellectual giant, someone who doesn’t let his emotions get the best of him, but someone who clearly just wants to help correct scientific errors, but I digress. If Inane D goes forward and publishes more response videos to my series I’ll have to seriously consider if it will be worth it. Based on his attempt in this video I suspect it will be more quote mining, circular reasoning, and misunderstanding sources. I may respond again just for the fun of it, but we shall see.
(1) Jeffery Schwartz and Sharon Begley (2002), The Mind and the Brain: Neuroplasticity and the Power of Mental Force, Page 21; New York: HarperCollins Publishers
(2) Wilder Penfield (1978), Mystery of the Mind, A Critical Study of Consciousness and the Human Brain, Page 53; Princeton: Princeton University Press
(3) Wilder Penfield (1978), Mystery of the Mind, A Critical Study of Consciousness and the Human Brain, Page 80; Princeton: Princeton University Press
(4) Bernardo Kastrup (2017), On the Plausibility of Idealism: Refuting Criticisms, BIBLID [0873-626X (2017) 44; pp. 13–34]
(5) Jerome Feldman (2013), The Neural Binding Problem(s), http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/pubs/ai/ICSI_NBPs12.pdf
(6) Susana Martinez-Conde Rich Krauzlis, Joel M. Miller,Concetta Morrone David Williams, Eileen Kowler (2008), “Eye movements and the perception of a clear and stable visual world,” http://jov.arvojournals.org/article.aspx?articleid=2193393
(7) Jon H. Kaas, Christine E. Collins (2004), The Primate Visual System, Page 153; CRC Press Web LLC
(8) Jon H. Kaas, Christine E. Collins (2004), The Primate Visual System, Page 387; CRC Press Web LLC